Rorty holds that truth exactly isn't a property of a proposition (correspondence to facts or whatever) - it's a force indicator. When one says 'X is true' he simply says that he accepts X, that is: he commits oneself to X. He takes James and Davidson to share this insight and he rejects the Peircean-Deweyan epistemic notion of truth as warranted assertability (semantic assertability, as Sellars - who endorsed it - called it).
While his position may seem confusing (-ed?) and explicitly anti-theorethical, it is actually not radically novel. Kant and Brentano thought that existence too is not a real predicate (a property) but merely an indicator of force.
Rorty holds that truth exactly isn't a property of a proposition (correspondence to facts or whatever) - it's a force indicator. When one says 'X is true' he simply says that he accepts X, that is: he commits oneself to X. He takes James and Davidson to share this insight and he rejects the Peircean-Deweyan epistemic notion of truth as warranted assertability (semantic assertability, as Sellars - who endorsed it - called it).
While his position may seem confusing (-ed?) and explicitly anti-theorethical, it is actually not radically novel. Kant and Brentano thought that existence too is not a real predicate (a property) but merely an indicator of force.